La storia non si evolve con un andamento costante, lungo una linea retta, ma con periodi lunghi in cui nulla avviene, interrotti da brevi momenti in cui tutto accade. Il modello è quello della lama di una sega.
Quando si parla di “Cigni Neri” ci si riferisce a “eventi inaspettati di larga magnitudine e al loro conseguente ruolo dominante nella storia. Tali eventi, considerati unici, giocano collettivamente un importante e vasto ruolo contrariamente al normale flusso dei normali eventi. “ (http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teoria_del_Cigno_Nero )
Un Cigno Nero è caratterizzato da:
Adesso ci troviamo in un momento storico in cui convergono diversi punti di inversione di cicli, quali:
- Borse e mercati: è opinione diffusa in certi circoli di pensiero che siamo al culmine di una bolla;
- Buoni del Tesoro e Obbligazioni: anche questi al top di una bolla;
- Settore Immobiliare: resistono ancora bolle speculative circoscritte (New York e Las Vegas, Cina, ecc.).
Di solito un evento che catalizzi le attenzioni e inneschi l’ “inversione” è quello che serve per far emergere i problemi e convogliare le “giustificazioni a posteriori” per “spiegare” l’inversione. Insomma, un Cigno Nero. Per poi sentirsi dire: “Chi avrebbe potuto dirlo?”. Dopo un warning preventivo del 15/02/2014 e la successiva conferma del 01/05/2014 , si stanno creando le condizioni perché si verifichi un “Cigno Nero”. Il momento, con buona pace degli ottimisti, offre diverse opportunità e non rimane che l’imbarazzo della scelta. Questi tra i nostri preferiti:
Stato generale dell’economia
Economia Europea in deflazione
L’economia US da segni di difficoltà
L’indice Chicago PMI collassa al minimo degli ultimi 13 mesi.
Da: Chicago PMI Collapses To 13-Month Lows, Biggest Miss On Record (ZH)
Situazione di warning sulle borse
(Da: 3 WTF Charts - ZH, 07/30/2014 )
Divergenze di alcuni indici …
Divergenze dei flussi (i mercati salgono ma la quantità di cash è in continuo calo – fuga) ...
Mercato dei crediti ad alto rendimento (e rischio) - HY Credit - che accende la spia rossa …
Divergenza tra l'indice HY Credit e l'indice S&P
Da Barclays Phil Solarz e carte da JC O'Hara at FBN Securities, @Not_Jim_Cramer, Barclays
Ma soprattutto, quello che sembra il più credibile (anche se, di solito, non è mai quello che si verifica…):
Crisi del settore bancario in EU che inneschi una successiva crisi Paese
Il cerchio si stringe, da Cipro, all'isolata banca Austriaca, al Banco Espirito Santo in Portogallo, troppo grande per essere salvato, si va in crescendo verso il centro dell’impero che, come molti già sanno, è la Deutsche Bank con il suo carico enorme di derivati.
La crisi può partire dal BES :
Questa la relazione tra i crediti del settore bancario europeo e la Russia, con buona pace delle sanzioni (!).
Dal report di Maxime Sbaihi: “Circa il 74 % dei crediti delle banche estere verso la Russia nel primo trimestre si è originato in Europa, secondo la Bank for International Settlements.
Le banche Francesi hanno i crediti maggiori (47 miliardi USD), seguite da quelle US (27 miliardi) e dall’Italia (USD 26 miliardi).
Le banche italiane sembrano le più esposte in percentuale sul totale delle esposizioni estere, secondo i dati riportati.
Source: Bloomberg Briefs e da The Only Chart You Will Need To Trade Russian Sanctions (ZH)
L’Antidiplomatico, Tra Scilla e Cariddi: la zona euro si appresta alla prossima crisi finanziaria. Bloomberg Briefs
Stratford, Europe's New Sanctions Against Russia Carry More Weight JULY 29, 2014
The European Union on Tuesday announced its strongest round of sanctions against Russia since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis. The sanctions are meant to show Moscow that the Europeans are willing to punish Russia for supporting the rebellion in eastern Ukraine. But they are also meant to contain political fragmentation within the European Union at a time when countries in Central and Eastern Europe are becoming increasingly uncomfortable with what they perceive as a lack of action from the bloc's largest economies. A few hours after the announcement, the United States also adopted additional sanctions against Russia.
Europe's sanctions prohibit state-owned Russian banks from buying or selling bonds and equity in the European Union, place an embargo on new arms sales, prohibit exports of dual use goods (software and technology that can be used for both civilian and military purposes) to Russia and restrict the export of certain energy-related equipment and technology to Russia. The sanctions will be revised every three months, depending on how the crisis in Ukraine unfolds. This is meant to give Europe enough time and flexibility to plan its next move.
Europe's plan is clear: Gradually increase sanctions that are designed to give Russia the time and space it needs to change its direction while making sure European businesses do not feel excessive pain.
Read more: Europe's New Sanctions Against Russia Carry More Weight | Stratfor
Stratford, Unione Europea: Le economie malate rimangono vulnerabili alle crisi bancarie ( European Union: Weak Economies Remain Vulnerable to Banking Crises)
Da Stratfor, JULY 25, 2014
Customers line up in front of a branch of Bulgaria's First Investment Bank in Sofia on June 27. (NIKOLAY DOYCHINOV/AFP/Getty Images)
Over the past two years, the European Union has created an environment in which member states facing economic problems can borrow at relatively low interest rates. Because of the European Central Bank's promise of intervention in debt markets, a sovereign debt crisis similar to what Greece experienced in 2010 seems unlikely. High unemployment and weak economic activity, however, continue to undermine the banking sectors of several EU countries, where a growing number of households and companies are struggling to pay back their bank loans.
While it is impossible to predict exactly when and where Europe's next banking crisis will take place, trouble is more likely in states such as Italy or Greece. Outside the eurozone, banks in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria will also struggle to reduce their portfolio of nonperforming loans. Since a banking crisis is essentially a crisis of confidence, a relatively small event in a secondary country could trigger EU-wide fears of a generalized crisis.
In recent weeks, tremors in Portuguese and Bulgarian banks reignited fears of an escalation of the EU financial crisis. First, political problems in Bulgaria culminated in banking panics in late June. Then in early July, news began to surface that the parent company of the Portuguese bank Espirito Santo was in financial trouble. Taken together, these stories reveal the fragility of confidence in the European banking sector.
Several things have changed since Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Cyprus were forced to request bailouts from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. First, the European Central Bank's promise to intervene in debt markets has calmed these markets. Even if countries such as Spain and Portugal have difficult times ahead, their governments are currently borrowing at record-low interest rates.
This reduces the possibility of another sovereign debt crisis in the short term but comes with inherent risks. Local investors, mostly banks, hold most of the government debt in Italy, Spain and Portugal. Banks are attracted to this sovereign debt because the interest rates are higher than in Germany or the United Kingdom, and they have confidence that the European Central Bank will back the bonds if it becomes necessary. As a result, banks in the European periphery are increasing their holdings of government debt while limiting credit to households and companies. This process lowers the prospects for a sustainable economic recovery. And as governments find it increasingly easy to sell debt, they will be tempted to postpone economic reforms and over-borrow again.
The European Union has also worked to break the link between fragile banks and central governments. In November, the eurozone will implement the first stage of the banking union in which the European Central Bank will start to oversee the largest banks. The second stage of the union -- the creation of a "single resolution mechanism" to handle banks in trouble -- has also seen progress. The rationale behind the second stage is to free central governments of the burden of saving failing banks and to prevent banking crises from dragging these governments down, as happened in Ireland.
Because Germany has the largest economy in Europe and carries the greatest share of the economic burden in bailing out the eurozone, it is at the forefront of this change of approach to banking crises. The German government approved draft laws July 9 introducing a system in which shareholders and customers will have to take losses when a bank encounters difficulties -- a process commonly known as "bail-in." Berlin hopes to implement the system, which would protect taxpayers from having to fund rescue packages for banks, in 2015, a year before similar EU rules would take effect. Germany's lower house, the Bundestag, must still approve the draft laws by the end of the year. In the coming months, Berlin will push other EU member states to approve similar measures in an effort to bring clarity to the procedure should a banking crisis occur.
Lastly, the European Central Bank has combined the offer of cheap long-term loans for banks with the application of stricter supervision. The bank has promised to be rigorous with its ongoing stress tests in an attempt to send a message to markets that banks are solid and under close oversight from Frankfurt. The central bank will announce these results in October.
Banking Crisis Versus Sovereign Debt Crisis
At the moment, another sovereign debt crisis in Europe seems unlikely. However, although the environment in financial markets has improved substantially since November 2011, when record high levels for Italian bond yields generated widespread fear that a eurozone collapse was imminent, things have actually gotten worse for many households and companies in Europe. The same is true of the banks that lend them money, a reality that could undermine many of the measures that the European Union has recently introduced.
Unemployment remains extremely high in Greece, Spain and Croatia and is also dangerously high in Italy and France. High unemployment means that in many European countries it has become increasingly difficult for families and companies to repay their debt. In some cases, borrowers simply cannot pay their mortgages or consumer loans. Others are "strategic defaulters" who are betting that their national government will offer schemes or moratoriums to relieve their debt.
Outside the eurozone, where the unemployment problem is not as dramatic, banks face other problems. In Hungary and Romania, individuals are having trouble paying their foreign-denominated loans, while in Bulgaria the combination of political instability, social unrest and friction between politicians and bankers has hurt the country's banking sector.
The European Union has successfully mitigated the threat of another debt crisis but has so far failed to address the problem of massive unemployment and its indirect impact on bank loans. Nonperforming loans continue to increase in European banks, and lenders have enjoyed only modest success in getting rid of them. At the peak of the economic crisis in the United States, the rate of nonperforming loans in U.S. banks was 5.6 percent; most European countries are still considerably above that level. The ratio of nonperforming loans is particularly high in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Romania and Slovenia.
The European Union is at a moment of uncertainty. The banking union has yet to begin operations, and markets, banks and customers are not sure how the continental bloc would react to another banking crisis. Perception is as important as reality during times of uncertainty. It may take nothing more than negative data from any of the banks in these countries to generate new fears of another banking crisis.
Risk Factors Across the Map
It is impossible to know where the next banking crisis will be, but data from recent months provides indications of which nations are most at risk.
Italy's large banking sector and weak economy make it a key place to watch. The Italian Banking Association warned July 11 that bad loans in the country had risen to 290 billion euros ($390 billion), up from 87 billion euros at the end of 2008. In the past three years, the top 40 Italian banking groups have posted average negative profits. The Bank of Italy warned July 8 that credit conditions continue to tighten in the country while unemployment continues to rise. Italy's largest banks, including UniCredit and Intesa Sanpaolo, have been selling some of their nonperforming loans, but smaller banks have not been able to do so.
(Grassetto sottolineato Nostro - ndr)
Greece will try to mitigate some of its banking problems in the next couple of months. Athens is putting together a plan to address growing private debt and is expected to present measures by mid-August. Unpaid private debt in Greece is believed to have reached 160 billion euros (88 percent of gross domestic product) and consists primarily of nonperforming loans held by Greek banks in addition to unpaid taxes and social security contributions. Nonperforming loans present the most serious difficulty, and more than a third of all loans in the Greek banking sector are more than 90 days overdue -- the highest ratio in the European Union outside of Cyprus. At the end of March, nonperforming loans stood at 77 billion euros and more than half were corporate loans.
Athens' new measures will reportedly be applied to companies first and households at a later stage. While the details of the plan are unknown, media outlets have reported that Athens is studying an out-of-court mechanism in which creditors would negotiate with debtors on the most appropriate package of debt settlement and payment. Greek officials have said the new measures would not include debt write-downs but would focus on extending installments and lowering interest rates. In the coming weeks, Greece will be dealing with the urgent issue of private debt while also negotiating with its lenders on longer maturities for its massive public debt.
Slovenia narrowly avoided a bailout in late 2013 by pumping some 3.3 billion euros into its banks, most of which are state-owned. The country's political environment remains fragile, and the next government will have to act quickly to ensure further financial stability. The situation is even more difficult in Cyprus, where more than a year after receiving financial aid, the Bank of Cyprus, the island's largest lender, needs additional recapitalization. According to the European Commission, more than half the loans in the bank are nonperforming. With unemployment at 15.3 percent in May (the fourth-highest rate in the European Union) and an expected decline of 4.8 percent in gross domestic product this year, the island will remain in crisis for some time.
Outside the eurozone, several countries are addressing the problem of rising nonperforming loans in different ways. Romania, where more than a fifth of bank loans are nonperforming, is trying to send positive signals to financial markets. On June 25, Bucharest announced plans to join the European Union's "single supervisory mechanism," which gives the European Central Bank power to supervise the stability of banks in participating countries, in 2015. For months, the Romanian central bank has been pushing banks to make large additional provisions for nonperforming loans, and these provisions are cutting into the banks' profitability.
Bulgaria, where the recent banking crises were mostly related to political clashes between bankers and politicians, is doing something similar. In mid-July, Sofia also announced plans to join the single supervisory mechanism. While this mechanism is primarily meant for eurozone banks, Bulgaria wants to signal that it will comply with the European Union's best practices and submit its banking sector to tighter control by the European Central Bank.
Hungary, however, has reacted to its banking problems in a completely different way. Budapest is preparing legislation to convert all foreign-denominated loans back into forints. The Hungarian government has yet to announce whether this conversion will be done at market rates or at special rates, as has been the case in the past. For now, foreign banks operating in the country insist they will stay, but Hungarian authorities have repeatedly said they want a larger part of the country's banking sector to be in Hungarian hands. This new legislation is unlikely to put an end to friction between Budapest and foreign banks.
Europe is at a point where it is seeing some incipient economic growth but without a substantial reduction in unemployment. Banks have reacted to the crisis by severely restricting lending and boosting their capital in an attempt to clean up their balance sheets. While this has temporarily stabilized Europe's banking sector, it has also deprived the economy of credit. This is a key element of economic growth, especially in Europe, where most companies rely on bank loans for funding. At the same time, austerity measures have reduced the purchasing power of families living in nations on the European periphery, hurting domestic consumption and further weakening prospects for solid economic growth. This vicious cycle of governments that do not spend, households that do not consume and banks that do not lend will continue to undermine Europe's real economy and create fertile ground for banking crises.
Read more: European Union: Weak Economies Remain Vulnerable to Banking Crises | Stratfor
Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook
L'estate è lunga.
Costo del debito US oltre il mezzo triliardo
Quali attività è più probabile che sopravvivano?
La resa dei conti nella UE
Un Decennio di tassi negativi
Dove andrà a finire il Denaro?
Inflazione 4%? Una follia
Nazione ingovernabile economia ingovernabile
Fuga di capitali da Italia e Spagna
Perchè l'Eurozona si distruggerà II
Perchè l'Eurozona si distruggerà
Tassi al -2% e vietare il contante?
Spagna: il programma di sicurezza sociale in fallimento
Brexit: Occhi sulle banche EU II
Brexit: occhi sulle banche EU
L'ammutinamento dei tassi
La struttura del collasso: 2016-2019
Banche Italiane e Francesi: i depositi sono al sicuro?
A proposito di vietare il contante
Le banche Europee Zombies III
Le banche Europee Zombies II
Le banche Europee Zombies I
La Sala degli Specchi
L'ultima volta che la FED
Grecia: Quando la Moneta muore
Ok Mr. Draghi: missione compiuta!
Europa, ciclo del credito e oro
Si è in procinto di confiscare i soldi in Grecia?
Tassi sui decennali; è già il contagio?
BDI: occhio alle differenze!
Italia: crediti inesigibili ai massimi
Austria: la misera fine della "Bad Bank"
Grecia: sette anni dopo - II
Grecia: sette anni dopo - I
4 domande sulla guerra commerciale
Così si comporta l'oro durante una crisi valutaria
Inizia un'altra corsa alle banche Greche
In procinto di una crisi valutaria globale
Prossima fase nella guerra valutaria - II
Prossima fase nella guerra valutaria - I
Buon 2015 e Buona Lettura
Giappone: la nuova recessione e il mistero dell'inatteso
Il debito US sotto Obama
Target2: Risorgono gli squilibri guidati dall'Italia - Parte II
Europa e Target2 - Parte I
Protezione della Privacy: web browser
Euro/Dollaro: spia del trend futuro
Cosa fare quando hai raggiunto il punto di rottura
Proteste contro l'Austerity?
5 cose sulle quali non puoi dissentire
Stress test e la matematica lava-più-bianco
L'interesse potrà mai essere rimborsato?
Buon 27-IMO anniversario del "Lunedì Nero"
L'elefante nella stanza e il Minsky Moment - II
L'Elefante nella stanza e il Minsky Moment - I
Ciclo K: Pesche, fichi e meloni
Un miracolo non basta a salvare l'Italia
Il Veneto ed il "Sì" della Scozia
Update: Sai che le cose in Europa stanno andando male quando...
I massimi esperti finanziari e la WW III - II
I massimi esperti finanziari e la WW III - I
Cibo per la mente
Update: in attesa di un "Cigno Nero"
Quando tutto il resto fallisce diamo la colpa al "Libero Mercato"
Parigi vuol tassare gli uffici sfitti; aspettatevi un crollo dei prezzi
Amazon, la Francia, la "Legge sulla concorrenza sleale" e la petizione dei commercianti di candele
Saxo Bank spiega come finiscono i grandi rallies delle borse - III
Saxo Bank spiega come finiscono i grandi rallies delle borse - II
Update: Una lezione interessante
La prima banca del Portogallo salta i pagamenti delle obbligazioni
Saxo Bank spiega come finiscono i grandi rallies delle borse - I
Mantenete la calma: la I Guerra Mondiale è già scontata dai mercati
Bank run: Bulgaria
Della verità sul potere monetario - II
Della verità sul potere monetario - I
Dedicato a tutti quelli che ... Te la risolvo io la crisi!
L'Europa sta affogando per un eccesso di debito pubblico
Il ciclo K e la crisi economica del 2014-2020
Update: Una banca del Portogallo
Seguite il denaro: il giornalismo delle corporations
Il messaggio di Coppock
La più grande ironia sull'ineguaglianza sociale
L'Europa dopo le elezioni del 2014
Il Paese delle Meraviglie vs. la realtà III
Il Paese delle Meraviglie vs. la realtà II
Il Paese delle Meraviglie vs. la realtà I
La Cina affronta un Minsky Moment - II
La Cina affronta un Minsky Moment - I
Lezioni dal panico del 1907 -II
Lezioni dal panico del 1907 - I
La roadmap che ci aspetta
Come finirà la FIAT Money
Spagna ...2014 - Italia 201?
Il messaggio di 2 secoli di finanze pubbliche
Perché la prossima crisi globale sarà diversa
Monetarismo e legge delle cattive idee - 2
Monetarismo e legge delle cattive idee - 1
Una banca austriaca dopo 83 anni
La legge delle cattive idee
Update: Ukraina e varie
Perché alcuni paesi emergenti stanno andando verso un crollo
Appelli dalla Cina per una Super-valuta Globale
Una storia italiana
Update: una contrazione in arrivo?
Analogie tra la Germani Nazista e la crisi attuale: la memoria corta di chi?
L'eredità di Carney - 2
L'eredità di Carney - 1
83 cifre del 2013 - 2
83 cifre del 2013 - 1
Cina - Stoccaggio cotone
Il futuro dell'Europa
Per ogni dettaglio vedi qui